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I.

APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS AND
PROCEDURALIDSTORY
The Respondents take great pains to recite their account of the record and procedural history

that does not appear to be relevant to the issues on appeal other than to be critical of counsel's
handling of the case. Since Respondents chose to raise these issues in the history of this case, the
Appellants are compelled to correct the record as necessary.
First, the Complaint in this matter was filed September 27, 2011, and Demand for Jury
Trial. R.pp.14-22
The Defendants were served and default entered December 5, 2011. The Defendants'
Motion to Set Aside Default and supporting Affidavit establishes that the Defendants had received
a pre-litigation demand letter in 2011 and were waiting to see if suit was timely filed. Defendants'
counsel discovered default on Defendant during a routine phone call between counsel, Ms. Brizee,
and a "new adjuster with the Hospital's Medical Malpractice Insurance carrier" when the new
adjuster asked about the prior demand letter and whether suit had been filed.

See Motion to

Augment, Exhibit "A". This prior demand letter contained, among other things, the opinions of the
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Kirt Birkenhagen, contained in a May 17, 2011, letter authored by Dr.
Birkenhagen. R. pp.209-210 Dr. Birkenhagen's correspondence was also attached to the Plaintiffs'
Expert Witness Disclosures. R.pp.170-186; 86-87; and 226-231
Defendants were fully aware of the opinions held by Dr. Birkenhagen as to both a breach of
the standard of care, and resulting damage to David Samples well prior to the filing of this
litigation.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1

Defendants brought their first Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to strike all of the
Plaintiffs' disclosed expert witnesses based upon a four (4) day delay in formal disclosure of expert
witnesses, despite prior disclosure in discovery responses. The Trial Court issued its Decision on
Motions to Strike Experts and to Dismiss New Claim holding that only Dr. Birkenhagen would be
permitted to testify, and striking any testimony from Plaintiffs' vocational expert, Nancy Collins,
though her, and Dr. Birkenhagen's opinions, were fully disclosed in discovery. R.pp.216-223
To alleviate any possible prejudice to Defendants, the Court extended Defendants' deadline
for disclosure of experts. Subsequently, the Trial Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Relief for
Order Setting Pretrial and Jury Trial after Defendants refused to make themselves and their experts
available for discovery depositions within days before trial, reasoning that the Court will not "allow
the Plaintiffs to circumvent the October 24, 2013, Order. .... ". R.p.608
To this extent, the Respondents' Brief is correct. The history of the Trial Court's Decisions
does provide context for the Trial Court's ultimate dismissal of the matter. The Trial Court's rigid
adherence to pretrial deadlines even when no prejudice was shown to Defendants does indicate a
context or backdrop for the Trial Court's ultimate disposition of this case on Summary Judgment.
The issue on appeal is the Trial Court's subsequent Decision Granting Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment, which argue that Dr. Birkenhagen lacked foundational requirements under
Idaho Code § 6-1013 to testify as to the applicable local community standard of care. R.pp.606-624
The Respondents also raise the issue of causation in an effort to convince this Court not to
reverse the Trial Court's erroneous Summary Judgment. Respondents assert that should this Court
reverse the Summary Judgment, Dr. Birkenhagen should not be allowed or be permitted to testify as
to the causation of David Samples' injury at trial. This issue is not before the Court on appeal.
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Besides being an irrelevant consideration, Respondents' assertion is also blatantly false.
The statements and disclosures by Dr. Birkenhagen and through discovery which were considered
by the Trial Courtas disclosures prior to the Court's cutoff deadline of September 30, 2013,
included voluminous medical records and opinions of causation attributing Mr. Samples ten (10)
surgeries and procedures and extended hospitalizations from October 2, 2009, until January, 2010,
followed by a month of rehabilitative care at Southwest Hospital, all as a result of the sepsis
condition caused, in Dr. Birkenhagen's opinion, by the negligent care by Defendants.
Lastly, in what can only be classified as a red herring, the Respondents raise the issue of
pretrial discovery in a blatant display of spinning the record before this Court assert that "the delays
in taking the depositions were caused, in large part, by Plaintiffs' continued rejection of proffered
deposition dates". Respondents' Brief, p.6
This particularly offensive and misleading statement defies the record before the Court. As
early as June 14, 2013, Plaintiffs' counsel requested of Defendants and Defendants' counsel
available dates for the "scheduling of depositions of her clients and any expert witnesses .... ". 1 R.
p.111
Five (5) days later in response to Appellants' counsel's Affidavit found at Page 111 of the
Clerk's Record, Respondents' counsel filed her Supplemental Affidavit but does not refute or
dispute Plaintiffs' counsel's Affidavit in regard to this issue. R.p.150
Later, Respondents' counsel acknowledges she overlooked this request and, apparently, the
subsequent requests of Plaintiffs' counsel. R.pp.576.

1

Plaintiffs' and their expert were made available for depositions on October 29, 2013.
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The history of Defendants' experts being unavailable for discovery depositions is well
documented in the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Vacate Trial, which was filed
December 2, 2013. R.pp.454-456. The Affidavit reiterates the prior Affidavit's statement that
discovery deposition dates were requested June 14th and further expands on counsel's attempts to
acquire cooperation from Defendants in the discovery process during conversations with counsel on
October 9th and through November and December.
The Defendants' efforts to frustrate and obstruct Plaintiffs' discovery depositions that would
have permitted further development of the issue of standard of care, are well documented in the
record and found in Plaintiffs renewed Motion to Vacate the Trial and Motion for Relief from the
Court's prior rulings and pretrial deadlines. R.pp. 452-6; 565-589; pp.597-605
This history is relevant since Respondents forged ahead on their summary judgment filed
November 7, 2013, while simultaneously frustrating Plaintiffs' discovery depositions attempts.
This allowed the trial Court to consider and grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with
incomplete information.

The history in the record is recapped with Defendants' response as

follows:
1.

June 14, 2013 - Correspondence to counsel requesting deposition dates in August

and September (no response).
2.

September 19, 2013 - Email to counsel regarding an extension of time for discovery

and renewed request for deposition scheduling (no response).
3.

Follow up voice message (no response)
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4.

September 29, 2013 - Defense counsel emailed alleging prior request for deposition

dates with Plaintiffs' counsel's September 30th response indicating receipt of no such prior request,
reminding counsel of Plaintiffs' prior request for deposition dates.
5.
Idaho.

th

October 9

in person discussion with counsel following hearings in Pocatello,

Counsel indicates she is unavailable until November and requests to take Plaintiffs'

depositions during the week of October 28 th . R. pp. 570, 576-81.
6.

November 13 th

-

Defendants' Expert Witness Disclosures identifying Drs. Llinas,

Hanson, Baird, Miciak and Holman.
7.

November 27, 2013

Renewed request for deposition dates of Dr. Hanson and

8.

December 2, 2013 - First response from defense counsel indicating that she would

experts.

"begin working on deposition dates today".
9.

December 11, 2013 - Communication that Dr. Llinas was unavailable except for

depositions in her new location in the state of Florida.
10.

December 11, 2013 - Communicating indicating that Dr. Hanson was unavailable

until "after Christmas", Dr. Baird available only the afternoon of December 27th and thereafter, and
no available dates for Drs. Miciak and Holman.
11.

Lastly, email on December 16, 2013, indicating neither Drs. Baird nor Miciak were

available until after January 3rd and January 2nd , respectively.

In short, the Defendants refused to make Drs. Hanson and Llinas available with Dr. Llinas
not being available at all despite her identification as an expert to be called by the Defendants and
Dr. Hanson being made unavailable until "after Christmas", just two (2) weeks prior to the trial date
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of January 16th • Likewise, Defendants' experts were also made unavailable until early January,just
days before the trial date.

It is easy to imagine that Plaintiffs, if given the opportunity to conduct discovery depositions
could have established through Drs. Hanson and Llinas that the standard of care did not differ on
October 2, 2009 to April or August, 2011, when Dr. Birkenhagen obtained privileges and was
hired as surgeon at Bingham Memorial Hospital following Dr. Hanson's retirement.

In short, the Defendants' intentional effort of obfuscating discovery depositions while
simultaneously pressing forward on the Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed Expert Dr.
Birkenhagen, allowed Defendants to convince the trial Court to grant their motion for summary
judgment, despite disputed issues of material fact regarding Dr. Birkenhagen's basis to testify as to
the standard of care and whether he was a "local" or "out of area" expert.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 6

ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review

Appellants respectfully submit that the Standard of Review postulated by the Respondents
of abuse of discretion is incorrect as the standard of review.
As indicated, even in Respondents' Brief, this appeal is from the Trial Court's granting of
Summary Judgment on Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed Expert, Dr. Birkenhagen,
which was deemed by the Trial Court to be a Motion for Summary Judgment. R.pp.234-251; 614
This posture of the case is undisputed in even Respondents' Brief, which acknowledges that
Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed Expert, Dr. Birkenhagen, was deemed a Motion
for Summary Judgment.
"On appeal :from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this court utilizes the same
standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on a motion.

Summary Judgment is

only proper when the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Mattox v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468,
_ _, 337 P.3d 627, 631-2 (2014)
The Respondents' Brief argues that the standard of care is abuse of discretion because the
issue is the admissibility of expert testimony and cites this court to Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus, 137
Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816,819 (2001). This misstates the holding in Dulaney.
Appellants respectfully submit that Mattox v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., provides
the applicable standard. While it is true that the court in Mattox also discussed the threshold issue
of admissibility of evidence as being evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard, the Court
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must distinguish from this case that both Dulaney and Mattox also involved motions to strike
certain affidavits submitted on summary judgment.

In Mattox, the defendants brought a motion for summary judgment and plaintiff responded
with two (2) affidavits, one from the primary care physician, the second from a nurse with
experience in skilled nursing homes out of the Lewiston area. The defendant, Life Care Center,
moved to strike the affidavits arguing them to be inadmissible because neither the nurse nor the
primary care physician had demonstrated actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care. The
District Court struck the plaintiffs' expert's affidavits and then granted summary judgment.

In this case, Defendants moved for summary judgment claiming that Dr. Birkenhagen was
not qualified to testify at trial which motion was deemed a summary judgment. No Motion to strike
affidavits was presented as a threshold issue to the summary judgment as with Dulaney and Mattox.
Rather, the Defendants brought a Motion for Order "striking Dr. Birkenhagen as an expert witness
and precluding the Plaintiffs from eliciting, offering or otherwise relying upon the testimony or
opinions of Dr. Birkenhagen at trial of this matter". R. p.234. In response to the Plaintiffs'
Objection, the Trial Court deemed the Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed Expert,
Dr. Birkenhagen, as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The issue before the Court was one of a Summary Judgment and was subject to the standard
of review for summary judgments, not an abuse of discretion standard, which might apply to a
Motion to Strike Affidavits, as found in the Dulaney and Mattox. 2 In both cases the issue of the
admissibility of affidavits was before the court to be resolved prior to addressing the summary

2

As with Mattox and Dulaney. the Dulaney court was faced with a Motion to Strike Portions of
Dulaney's medical experts' Affidavits. The Motions were granted based on the inadmissible
nature of the affidavit testimony.
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judgment.

both cases, the standard of review applicable to the admissibility of testimony in

affidavits is one of abuse of discretion. I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires that affidavits in response or in
support of summary judgment be made upon "personal knowledge" and shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence. Rule 56(e) requires the Court to determine whether or not
evidence before it is admissible before determining whether that evidence raises a genuine issue of
material fact prohibiting summary judgment.
The Defendants' Motion in this case was a Summary Judgment and is, therefore, subject to
the review as a Summary Judgment. "We construe all disputed facts and draw all reasonable
inferences from the record, in favor of the non-moving party. Summary Judgment is appropriate
only if the evidence in the record and any admissions show that there is no genuine issue of any
material fact regarding the issues raised in the pleadings and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw." Ellmaker v. Tabor, 2015 W.L. 797642 (2015); citing Infanger v. City
of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-7, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101-2 (2002)
B.

Genuine issues of material fact in the record prohibited Summary Judgment
upon a tmding that Dr. Birkhagen was an "out-of-area expert" and lacked
knowledge of the local standard of care.

Despite Respondents' attempt to argue disputed facts as a basis for affirming the Trial
Court's grant of Summary Judgment, there are some facts that are without dispute.
First, Dr. Birkenhagen was clearly not an out-of-area expert or medical professional as of
April, 2011, when he was granted admitting privileges at Bingham Memorial Hospital
approximately four (4) months prior to his hiring in August to replace a retiring Dr. Hanson.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 9

Second, Dr. Birkenhagen was hired in August before Dr. Hanson retired in October. R.pp.
445; 544-7. Bingham Memorial Hospital must have been well aware of his qualifications when
hiring him and his knowledge of the standard of care as a surgeon.
From this it is clear there were no intervening professionals in Hanson's position that may
have imposed a different standard of care. Dr. Hanson's answers to discovery further established
his sworn statement that he was a member of the American College of Surgeons from 1977 to
"Present" and Board Certified three (3) times beginning 1977 onward. R.pp.444-445

Third, Dr. Birkenhagen's Affidavit establishes his foundation and competence to testify in
this matter. Dr. Birkenhagen was Board Certified and a member of the American College of
Surgeons, like Dr. Hanson. Dr. Birkenhagen states that he is "familiar with the standard of care
with regard to general surgery at Bingham Memorial Hospital and in the Blackfoot, Idaho
community by virtue of my experience practicing there since the Spring of 2011 ". R. p.4 38
Fourth, Dr. Birkenhagen establishes his competence to testify as to the standard of care just
a few months earlier on October 2, 2009, and that said standard of care was no different in April,

2011 when Dr. Birkenhagen was granted privileges or August when hired just prior to Dr. Hanson's
retirement.
Dr. Birkenhagen establishes his knowledge of that standard of care by stating that his
opinion was based upon his review Dr. Hanson's credentials, the fundamental standard of care
expected of a surgeon holding oneself out with the credentials possessed by Dr. Hanson, and based
upon a review of the records of David Samples in October, 2009, at Bingham, as compared to Mr.
Samples' condition hours later when Dr. Birkenhagen treated him at Portneuf Medical Center.
R.p.251
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Dr. Birkenhagen also familiarized himself with the standard of care being administered by
his predecessor upon his hiring and determined from this and other factors that it had not changed
in the preceding eighteen (18) months since Mr. Samples care in October, 2009. R. Pp. 437-41.
Additionally, Dr. Birkenhagen admitted to speaking with another surgeon, Dr. Anthony
Davis, about how things are done and were done at Bingham Memorial Hospital in 2009.

1.

Dr. Birkenhagen had full knowledge of the standard care at Bingham
Memorial Hospital.

"Idaho Code § 6-1013 requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff establish the defendant's
failure to meet the applicable standard of healthcare practice to the testimony of at least one
'knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses"'. Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169,

, 335 P.3d

14, 19 (2014).
The statute goes on to require that the foundation required for such testimony is "(a) that
such an opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) that said opinion can be testified to with
reasonable medical certainty, and (c) that such expert witness possesses professional knowledge
and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard to which
his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed". LC.§ 6-1013(2014)
It is without question that Dr. Birkenhagen has the qualifications necessary under Idaho
Code § 6-1013. From April, 2011, he had admitting privileges at Bingham and in August, 2011, Dr.
Birkenhagen was hired as a surgeon at Bingham while Dr. Hanson retired two (2) months later in
October. Plaintiffs' expert further testified that he was familiar from his review of David's chart as
to the care administered on October 2, 2009, as well as his review of procedures in place upon Dr.
Birkenhagen's receiving admitting privileges and being hired in August of 2011. Dr. Birkenhagen
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also testified to speaking with another surgeon., Dr. Anthony Davis, at Bingham about how business
was conducted at Bingham eighteen (18) months prior to his having privileges and being hired at
Bingham. Additionally, Dr. Birkenhagen had the advantage of reviewing procedures and record of
his immediate predecessor, the Defendant, Dr. Hanson, upon his hiring in August, 2011.
Additionally, it should not be forgotten that Dr. Birkenhagen practiced less than thirty (30)
miles away and receiving patients, including David Samples, on referral from Bingham.
Respondents rest their argument (aside from numerous collateral issues raised) in defense of
the Trial Court's grant of Summary Judgment upon one simple issue: Defendants' assertion that
Dr. Birkenhagen did not possess personal knowledge of the standard of care at Bingham Memorial
Hospital on October 2, 2009.

In other words, Defendants assert that under the opinion in

Suhadolnik v. Pressman, Dr. Birkenhagen lacked personal knowledge of the standard of care for the
"relative timeframe".
However, the Idaho Supreme Court has since noted that the manner in which a plaintiff's
expert familiarizes himself or herself with the applicable standard of care should not be viewed as
"formulaic" in establishing the appropriate foundation under Idaho Code§ 6-1013. Mattox, supra.

In this case, Dr. Birkenhagen' s testimony is that he is familiar with the standard of care and
that it did not differ upon his hiring or admitting privileges in 2011 from the standard applicable
eighteen (18) months earlier when David Samples was treated in October, 2009. Dr. Birkenhagen
bases this upon a variety of factors, as well as his opinion that this standard of care is "national" for
a doctor holding himself out as a general surgeon, board certified in surgery and a member of the
American College of Surgeons. R.p.251; pp.438-9
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This Court has previously acknowledged that "by virtue of their training, board certified
specialists are familiar with local standard of care which is equivalent to the national standard of
care. In order to meet the requirements of LC. § 6-1013(c) showing adequate familiarization, a
specialist must demonstrate two elements: First, that he is board certified that same specialty as
that of the defendant physician; this demonstrates knowledge that the appropriate standard of care
of board certified physicians practicing in the specialty. Second, an out-of-area doctor must inquire
of the local standard in order to ensure that there are no local deviations from the national standard
under which the defendant physician and witness physician were trained." Kozlowski v. Rush, 121
Idaho 825, 828, 828 P.2d 854,857 (1992).
Dr. Birkenhagen' s testimony is admissible both under the board certified national standard
as well as his testimony as to his personal knowledge of the local standard of care. It was error for
the Trial Court to grant Summary Judgment based upon a finding that Dr. Birkenhagen is not
qualified. This Court should reverse and remand with instructions accordingly.
2.

Dr. Birkenhagen is not an out-of-area expert.

The Trial Court made a finding in its Memorandum Decision that Dr. Birkenhagen was an
out-of-area expert and was disqualified from testifying despite his board certification and
affiliations as a surgeon which are addressed above. This finding was erroneous and should be
reversed.

R.pp.615-619.

Specifically, the Trial Court found that despite Dr. Birkenhagen's

specialized board certification and specialization, "the law still requires that Birkenhagen inquire of
the local standard in order to ensure that there are no local deviations from the national standard
under which the defendant physician and Witness physician were trained." The Trial Court found
that Dr. Birkenhagen "did not do this and did not see a need to make such an inquiry". R.pp.618-619.
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The Trial Court's findings set forth above are incorrect, erroneous and disregard the facts in
the record. As indicated above, Dr. Birkenhagen, by Affidavit, as well as testimony, revealed
numerous ways in which he had familiarized himself with the local standard of care including
speaking to a local physician, Dr. Anthony Davis, reviewing records and procedures in place upon
his arrival at Bingham eighteen (18) months after the negligent care of Mr. Samples at Bingham,
review of David Samples' medical records, and Dr. Birkenhagen's first hand care of David Samples
just hours following his transfer from Bingham to Portneuf in October, 2009. The record reflects
that Dr. Birkenhagen found a severely septic patient at the time of David's transfer to Portneuf,
whose pulmonary symptoms were a direct and obvious symptom of the infection arising from an
unrepaired colon leak.
Respondents' Brief argues that David's sepsis could have resulted from either the
breakdown of the colon repair or a failure to detect and repair the tear by Dr Hanson. This
argument misses the point.
The issue of negligence, according to Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony, has never been about
the surgical procedure, but rather the lack of post-surgical care. Dr. Birkenhagen's testimony is
clear in his depositions, affidavits and May, 2011, statement on this point. Dr. Birkenhagen notes
the following lapse in care under Dr. Hanson at Bingham:
1.

Dr. Hanson ignored blood work indicating very high infection reading.

2.

Dr. Hanson deferred post-surgical treatment or care of David to another Bingham

employee, a hospitalist, Dr. Llinas.
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3.

Dr. Hanson did not reopen the surgical site or transfer David sooner, despite

pulmonary distress indicative of sepsis and indicating Dr. Hanson's lack of awareness of David's
septic condition.
Dr. Birkenhagen's familiarity with this patient, as a transfer from Bingham, together with
his subsequently gained knowledge in the spring and summer of2011, some eighteen (18) months
after these events, all indicate that Dr. Birkenhagen was certainly not an out-of-area expert by the
spring of 2011 and had adequately familiarized himself with the "local" standard of care, if any, and
that that standard did not differ in October, 2009.
All of these facts indicate a genuine issue of disputed fact that require this Court to deny
Summary Judgment and this matter should have proceeded to trial with the testimony of Dr.
Birkenhagen being allowed.

It was error for the Trial Court to grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and
this Court is asked to reverse and remand with instruction.
C.

Respondent's Brief misconstrues Appellants' Brief as challenging the Trial
Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' Motions to Vacate Trial.

Beginning at page 32 of Respondents Brief and running through page 40, the Respondent
misconstrues the Appellants' Brief as challenging the Court's "denial" of a motion to vacate the
trial date. Respondent correctly points out the Trial Court ultimately vacated and continued the trial
date from Mid- January to February based on the Trial Court's own calendar conflict. Appellants'
Brief, pages I 7 through 20, is directed at the Trial Court rigid adherence to the Pretrial Order
deadlines and Appellant's Motion for Relief filed November 7, 2013. R.pp. 254-260. Admittedly,
the Motion for Relief ended up being interwoven with the Motions to Vacate Trial as Defendants'
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stonewalling of Plaintiffs' attempt to conduct discovery depositions became more acute. However,
the underlying issue was the Court's rigid adherence to its original Pretrial Deadlines issued
January 30, 2013, despite Plaintiffs evidence of Defendants' frustration of discovery depositions
and the lack of prejudice to Defendants in light of significant prejudice to Plaintiffs.
A trial court has authority to sanction parties for non-compliance
with pretrial orders. Sanctions may include those enumerated in
LR.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D) for discovery violations. One
such authorized sanction is the disallowance of specified evidence.
I.R.C.P. 3 7(b)(2)(B). The imposition of such sanctions is
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and we will not
overturn such a decision absent a manifest abuse of that discretion.
Priest v. Landon, 135 Idaho 898, 900,
26 P.3d 1235, 1237 (App. 2001)

Despite Appellants' argument to the Trial Court in early October that their failure to
initially meet the September 16th expert disclosure deadline by a matter of a few days, the
Trial Court felt compelled to exclude some of Plaintiffs' expert witness testimony from
Nancy Collins. Contrary to Respondents Brief, the Court did not rule on the scope to Dr.
Birkenhagen' s testimony and exclude evidence of causation, which was previously
disclosed. As noted by the Court in the Memorandum Decision, those issues were denied
"without being decided on the merits." R.p.620.
However, in light of the Defendants' abuse of the discovery process and counsel's
repeated requests for timely depositions of Drs. Hanson, Llinas, Miciak, Holman and Baird
(the first two witnesses identified and requested by Plaintiffs since June 14th) it is error for
the Trial Court not to have modified the Pretrial Order as requested by Counsel for
Appellant.
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The decision to impose sanctions is a discretionary one resting with the trial Court.
When reviewing a trial court's discretionary decision, we apply a
three-part test, examining whether the trial court ( 1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion in a manner consistent with applicable
legal standards; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise of
reason.
Priest v. Landon, 135 Idaho, supra.
This Court has found it is an abuse of discretion to impose the severest of sanctions
without consideration of lesser sanctions. "Specific findings regarding the inadequacy of lesser
sanctions are necessary to sustain the more serious sanction of striking pleadings and entering
judgment .... " Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118, 121, 822 P.2d 1015, 1018,
(App. 1991).
While the Court in this case did not specifically strike pleadings or enter
judgment, it did strike testimony of Appellants' expert based on Appellants disclosure just days
following the deadline. The Court did this despite alleviating any prejudice to Defendants by
extending their expert witness disclosure deadline to mid-November.

"In its deliberations, the

trial court should consider the length of the delay occasioned by the plaintiffs' failure to move the
case, any justification for the delay, and the resultant prejudice to the defendant." Day v. CIBA
Geigy Corp., 115 Idaho 1015, 1017, 772 P.2d 222,224 (1989). As stated, the Plaintiffs delay
amounted to days and, as addressed in Affidavit, was unintentional and they moved swiftly to
correct the same. R.pp.109-114.
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Further, the Court adhered to this finding when Defendants refused to make those experts
or the Defendants, Dr. Hanson (also disclosed as an expert) available for depositions to meet the
pending Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed Expert, Dr. Birkenhagen/Summary Judgment.
In order to justify the sanctions of dismissal of pleadings and entry
of judgment, the record below must clearly reflect both delay and
ineffective lesser sanctions, and must be bolstered by at least one
"aggravating" factor such as delay which is: (1) intentional, (2)
caused by the plaintiff personally, or (3) results in prejudice to the
other party.
Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118, 122,
822 P.2d 1015, 1019 (App. 1991)
There is no record or fact supporting a finding that Plaintiffs ever intentionally delayed
compliance with the Courts' Pretrial deadlines or that it was caused by the Plaintiffs' personally.
Further, the prejudice, if any, to Defendants was alleviated by the Court's extension of their
deadlines.
Despite this clear record, the Trial Court felt compelled to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for
Relief from the Pretrial Order, stating: "This Court will not modify the Scheduling Order to
allow the Plaintiffs to circumvent the October 24, 2013 order. .. ". The Court seems to have
perceived Plaintiffs or Counsel as having demonstrated some pattern or intent to circumvent the
Court's order, without facts or findings supporting this punitive holding. Further, the Court's
original October 24, 2013 order excluding witnesses and testimony was done without
consideration of whether Plaintiffs conduct was intentional, personally committed by Plaintiffs
and whether any actual prejudice was occasioned to Defendants that could not be alleviated by
other measures.
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This Court has previously held that it is error for a trial court to enter sanctions, especially
crippling sanctions of excluding testimony and striking witnesses, where the trial court failed to
make specific findings regarding whether or not alternate or lesser sanctions would have been
adequate. See: S. Idaho Prod. Credit Association v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526,531, 746 P.2d
985, 990 (1987).
It was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to strike Plaintiffs' testimony and

witnesses in its October 24, 2013 ruling. It was further abuse of discretion to have denied
Plaintiffs subsequent Motion for Relief from Pretrial Order, especially in light of the Defendants'
obstruction of the discovery process depriving the Plaintiff adequate opportunity to meet the
pending Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Proposed Expert, Dr. Birkenhagen.
The Court is asked to reverse the Trial Court and remand with instructions to reset the
trial and pretrial deadlines.

D.

Attorney's Fees

Respondents' Brief seeks an award of attorney's fees arguing that under Idaho Code§ 12121 and I.AR. 41(a) this appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
"Under Idaho Code § 12-121, an award of attorney's fees on appeal is appropriate when this
court is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation." Urrutia v. Harrison, 156 Idaho 677, 682, 330 P.3d 1035,
1040 (2014).
The Appellants respectfully submit that this issue presents genuine issues of fact and, in
light of Idaho case law, Appellants' appeal was not brought frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. The Court should, therefore, deny Respondents' request for attorney's fees on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
This Court is asked to reverse the Trial Court's grant of Summary Judgment and remand for
trial. The Appellants should be awarded fees and costs on appeal.
st

DATED this 1 day of May, 2015.
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.

Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the I st day of May, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following manner:
Jennifer Brizee, Esq.
POWERS TOLLMAN, PLLC
132 3rd A venue East
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1276
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